Journal of Business & Technology Law
Volume 6 | Issue 1

Article 8

Independent Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie:
Maryland's Precarious Balance Between Internet
Defamation and the Right to eAnonymity
Bryce Donohue

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/jbtl
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Torts Commons
Recommended Citation
Bryce Donohue, Independent Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie: Maryland's Precarious Balance Between Internet Defamation and the Right to
eAnonymity, 6 J. Bus. & Tech. L. 197 (2011)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/jbtl/vol6/iss1/8

This Notes & Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Business & Technology Law by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more
information, please contact smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.

Bryce Donohue*

Independent Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie:

Maryland’s Precarious Balance Between Internet
Defamation and the Right to eAnonymity
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Independent Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie,1 the Court of Appeals of

Maryland established the standard for Maryland courts to apply when
balancing an individual’s First Amendment right to speak anonymously on
the Internet against a plaintiff’s right to seek judicial redress for
defamation.2 In this case of first impression, the court developed a five part
test (the “Brodie Test”) consisting of: (1) notice; (2) opportunity to respond;
(3) identifying the exact statements alleged to be defamatory; (4) prima
facie proof of the allegations; and (5) a balancing test.3 In attempting to
guide the lower courts, the first four elements of the Brodie court’s test
provide much direction.4 The inclusion of a balancing component, however,
causes the Brodie Test to fall short of its goal of establishing a clear
standard for the lower courts to apply because the balancing component
subjects the outcome of cases to a great deal of judicial discretion.5 The
Brodie Test blurs the line between defamation and legitimate discourse and
will hinder the development of the Internet and keep it from reaching its
potential as a truly credible public forum.6

© 2011 Bryce Donohue.
*
J.D. Candidate, University of Maryland School of Law, May 2011; B.A. History and
Philosophy, Boston College, May 2008.
1. 966 A.2d 432 (Md. 2009).
2. Id. at 457.
3. Id.
4. See infra Parts IV.A–B.
5. See infra Part IV.C.
6. See infra Part IV.C.
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II.

The Case

A. Factual Background
The controversy in Independent Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie7 revolved
around statements made by anonymous Internet forum participants who
posted comments to a website operated by the appellee, Independent
Newspapers, Inc. (“Independent Newspapers”).8 The anonymous Internet
forum participants were known only by their screen-names:9
“CorsicaRiver,” “Born & Raised Here”10 and “chatdusoleil,” (collectively:
“John Doe Defendants”).11 The three John Doe Defendants posted
comments to a message board in response to two separate articles published
by Independent Newspapers about appellant Zebulon J. Brodie.12
The first discussion thread (the “Centreville Eyesore”), dated March
14, 2006, contained comments chastising a developer for burning down Mr.
Brodie’s former home in Centreville, Maryland.13 The second discussion
7. 966 A.2d 432 (Md. 2009).
8. Id. at 442.
9. Encyclopedia, PC MAGAZINE, Aug. 26, 2010 (Screen names are defined as pseudonyms
that
individuals
use
when
interacting
on
the
Internet.),
available
at,
http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia_term/0,2542,t=username&i=53570,00.asp.
10. The screen name cited by the court is “Born & amp; Raised Here” The reason for the
“amp;” is because that is how the screen name appears in html code. I have removed the html code
to avoid confusion. See Brodie, 966 A.2d at 442.
11. Id. Independent Newspapers is a media corporation which operates the website
www.newszap.com, a news website that allows users to post comments on various news stories
posted on the site. Id. at n.11.
12. Id. at 443–47.
13. Id. at 443–44.
CorsicaRiver: I think there must be a special circle in Hell reserved for a greedy selfish
developer who deliberately burns down a beautiful pre-Civil War house, after cutting
down all the 100-year-old [C]ypress trees around it. A really hot circle of Hell, where
they do nasty things to you with nail guns and hot asphalt.
What I'm referring to is not in Centreville, but nearby in Church Hill . . . . The white
Greek Revival house facing 213 that Zeb Brodie sold 3 months ago for $1.85 mil to
developers, who deliberately torched it this past weekend. As of this morning, they
were bulldozing the charred remnants. There goes another one of our County's historic
landmarks, a sight that used to lift my spirits every time I past [sic] it on 213.
Shame on you Mr. Brodie!
Born & Raised Here: Oh my God, they burned the place down? I can't believe it!!!!!! I
heard Bill Sharp bought it from Brodie, don't know if that's true or not. Has anyone else
heard the same thing?
CorsicaRiver: Yes, they burned it down . . . and shame on Bill Sharp as well as Mr.
Brodie!
I just found out some more information about the house. It was known as the Charles
Cahall Farm and apparently dated back to the 1850s. In his 1980 historical sites survey,
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thread (“Unsanitary Dunkin Donuts”), dated March 17–21, 2006, contained
comments relating to unsanitary conditions in a Dunkin Donuts which Mr.
Brodie owned and operated.14 The evidence provided by Mr. Brodie
reflects that the parties responsible for the defamatory statements in the
Unsanitary Dunkin Donuts discussion thread posted under the screen-names
“RockyRaccoonMD” and “Suze” (collectively the “Unnamed
Offenders”).15 Neither of the Unnamed Offenders was named in the
complaint.16
B. Procedural History
On May 26, 2006, Zebulon Brodie filed a two-count complaint in the
Circuit Court for Queen Ann’s County, Maryland, in which he alleged
defamation and conspiracy to defame against Independent Newspapers, Inc.
and the three John Doe Defendants.17 Independent Newspapers argued that
it was immune from liability under the Federal Communications and
Decency Act18 and filed a “Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for
Summary Judgment.”19 In support of its motion, Independent Newspapers
argued that the comments in the “Centreville Eyesore” discussion thread
made by the three John Doe Defendants were “non-actionable opinion”
because the comments implicated the developer to whom Mr. Brodie sold

Orlando Ridout of the Maryland Historic Trust called it “one of the most carefully,
preserved farmhouses in the country,” “remarkable,” and “virtually untouched.” There
were also a well-preserved meat house, windmill, and granary.
***
chatdusoleil: Has there been a news story on the fire this weekend? Or an
investigation?
Id.
14. Id. at 446.
Suze: . . . I haven’t seen the inside of a DD in a while, but have you seen the outside? I
drove . . . through not long ago and was completely and utterly SHOCKED at the
amount of trash . . . . It’s apparent no one is cleaning the outside of the [sic] building . .
. . If they don’t keep the outside clean . . . hmm . . . makes you wonder.
RockyRacoonMD: I wouldn’t go to that Dunkin’ Donuts of Brodie’s anyway . . . taken
a close look at it lately? One of the most dirty and . . . looking food-service places I
have seen . . . I bought coffee . . . couple of times but quickly lost my appetite . . . .
Id.
15. Id. at 446–47.
16. Id. at 442.
17. Id. (The John Does named in the Complaint are identified only by their usernames:
“Corsica River,” “Born & amp; Raised Here” and “chatdusoleil.”). Id.
18. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006).
19. Brodie, 966 A.2d at 443.
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his home and were not “of and concerning Brodie.”20 Before a ruling was
made on its initial motion, Independent Newspapers filed a second “Motion
for a Protective Order” to shield it from being compelled to identify the
three John Doe Defendants.21
In an order dated November 21, 2006,22 the circuit court dismissed
Independent Newspapers from the case, ruling that because Independent
Newspapers was an “interactive computer service,”23 and the John Doe
Defendants were “information content provider[s],”24 under the Federal
Communications and Decency Act,25 Independent Newspapers could not be
sued as the publisher of the statements.26 The same order, however,
compelled the identification of the three John Doe Defendants.27
Independent Newspapers immediately petitioned the court to reconsider the
order compelling identification of the three John Doe Defendants and in
support argued that the court had improperly assumed that the statements
posted by the three John Doe Defendants were actionable, without requiring

20. Id.
21. Id. at 444–45.
22. Id. at 445.
23. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (f)(2) (2006) (“The term ‘interactive computer service’ means any
information service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access
by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides
access to the Internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational
institutions.”).
24. See id. at § 230 (f)(3) (“The term ‘information content provider’ means any person or
entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information
provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer service.”).
25. See id. at § 230. The Federal Communications and Decency Act was enacted to promote
the five-part policy of the United States for communications on the Internet.
It is the policy of the United States (1) to promote the continued development of the
Internet and other interactive computer services and other interactive media; (2) to
preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet
and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation; (3) to
encourage the development of technologies which maximize user control over what
information is received by individuals, families, and schools who use the Internet and
other interactive computer services; (4) to remove disincentives for the development
and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies that empower parents to restrict
their children’s access to objectionable or inappropriate online material; and (5) to
ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and punish trafficking in
obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of computer.
Id.
26. Brodie, 966 A.2d at 445 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 230 (c)(1) (2006) (“No provider or user of an
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information
provided by another information content provider.”)).
27. Id.
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any showing that Brodie had a valid cause of action.28 Upon
reconsideration, the circuit court dismissed the cause of action arising out of
the statements in the Centreville Eyesore discussion thread, but enforced the
subpoena relating to the claim arising out of the statements in the
Unsanitary Dunkin Donuts discussion thread.29 Accordingly, on March 12,
2007, the circuit court ordered the identification of the forum participants
who made the allegedly defamatory remarks in the Unsanitary Dunkin
Donuts discussion thread.30
In an attempt to comply with the March 12, 2007 order, Independent
Newspapers requested the specific allegations of defamation relating to the
Unsanitary Dunkin Donuts discussion thread from plaintiff’s counsel.31
Plaintiff’s counsel identified the allegedly defamatory comments and the
John Does’ screen names in a letter that read in part: “It seems, from my
reading of the enclosure, that the identifiable ‘posters’ are RockyRacoonMD
and Suze.”32 Shortly after sending this letter, plaintiff’s counsel served
another subpoena on Independent Newspapers ordering discovery of “any
and all documents and tangible things identifying and/or relating to [the
three John Doe Defendants], ‘RockyRacoonMD’ and ‘Suze.’”33 Despite
Independent Newspapers’ motion to quash and/or for a protective order,
and Independent Newspapers’ argument that Brodie had failed to assert an
actionable claim of defamation, the court denied Independent Newspapers’
motion and ordered Independent Newspapers to comply with the subpoena
and identify all five anonymous forum participants.34
The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari prior to any
proceedings in the Court of Special Appeals to decide whether the court
properly denied Independent Newspapers’ motion to quash and/or for a
protective order, and to discuss what standard to employ when balancing an
individual’s First Amendment right to speak anonymously on the Internet
against a plaintiff’s right to seek judicial redress for defamation.35

28. Id.
29. Id. at 445–46.
30. Id. (“ORDERED, that the requested protective order is denied as to statements regarding
Plaintiff’s businesses to the extent providing available discovery regarding the identity of those
individuals who made statements that the Plaintiff’s food service business was maintained in a
‘dirty and unsanitary-looking’ manner, and was permitting trash from the business to pollute the
nearby waterway.”). See supra notes 13 and 14 for a description of the two discussion threads.
31. Brodie, 966 A.2d at 446.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 447.
34. Id.
35. Id.
VOL. 6 NO. 1 2011
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III. Legal Background

Freedom of speech, as protected by the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution,36 is one of the cornerstones of American democracy.37
Though not explicitly enumerated in the Constitution, an individual’s right
to anonymity is implied by courts to be within the protections of the First
Amendment.38 These protections apply to state and local governments
through the Fourteenth Amendment,39 and have been interpreted to extend
equally to communications on the Internet.40 The protections of the First
Amendment, however, are not absolute41 and may be curtailed to protect
other interests.42 For example, the First Amendment does not protect
defamatory statements.43 Accordingly, an individual’s First Amendment
right to anonymity on the Internet may be superseded by a plaintiff’s right
to protect their reputation in cases of defamation.44 Recognizing these

36. U.S. CONST. amend. I. (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech
. . . .”).
37. See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960). See also THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD
A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 3 (Random House 1966); Stephen R.
McAllister, Funeral Picketing Laws and Free Speech, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 575, 577 (2007).
38. See, e.g., Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc. of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150,
165–66 (2002) (finding that requiring an anonymous speaker to reveal her identity is offensive to
the values protected by the First Amendment); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S.
334, 342 (1995) (“[A]n author's decision to remain anonymous, like other decisions concerning
omissions or additions to the content of a publication, is an aspect of the freedom of speech
protected by the First Amendment.”).
39. Eanes v. State, 569 A.2d 604, 608 (Md. 1990) (citing Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652
(1925)).
40. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (applying the same First Amendment
protections to the Internet as are applied to other mediums); see also Doe v. 2THEMART.COM,
140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1093 (2001) (reasoning that stripping Internet users their anonymity would
have a “significant chilling effect on Internet communications and thus on basic First Amendment
Rights”).
41. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (“[I]t is well
understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances.”);
see also Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952) (“Libelous utterances [are] not . . .
within the area of constitutionally protected speech . . . ”).
42. See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 (finding that defamatory and libelous speech are not
protected by the First Amendment because they do not constitute any “essential part of any
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may
be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”).
43. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 245–46 (2002) (finding that as a
general principle, the First Amendment does not protect defamatory statements).
44. See, e.g., Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 460 (Del. 2005) (holding that before a defamation
plaintiff can obtain the identity of an anonymous defendant through the compulsory discovery
process he must support his defamation claim with facts sufficient to defeat a summary judgment
motion).
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competing interests, many courts have sought to balance these interests with
easily discernable tests.45 To date, there is no consensus on how courts
should balance these competing interests,46 but four principles have guided
courts in determining the appropriate test for their jurisdiction: (1) the
essential feature that has enabled the Internet to become such a pervasive
forum for public discourse is the ability for individuals to interact
anonymously;47 (2) because of the nature of the Internet, judicial
intervention is not always required for a plaintiff to obtain a remedy;48 (3)
the ease of identifying anonymous Internet forum participants opens the
door to potential abuses of the legal process;49 (4) the court must balance
the interest in a free-flowing exchange of ideas on the Internet with the
interest of preventing abuses of the protection that anonymity provides.50
This section will first offer a brief overview of the law of defamation,
including the elements of the cause of action and how the cause of action is
proved.51 Next, this section will discuss some of the features of the Internet
that distinguish Internet defamation cases from traditional defamation
cases.52 To that end, Part B of this section will analyze the importance of
the Internet as a public forum,53 how the Internet provides unique extrajudicial remedies to some individuals,54 and how the technology behind the
Internet alters the normal defamation analysis.55 Finally, this section will
give an overview of three different standards employed by various state

45. See infra, Part III.C.
46. Compare Cahill, 884 A.2d at 460 (applying a summary judgment standard), with In re
Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online, Inc., 2000 WL 1210372, at *8 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2000)
(applying a “good faith” test).
47. See Doe v. 2THEMART.COM, 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1093 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (“The
free exchange of ideas on the Internet is driven in large part by the ability of Internet users to
communicate anonymously.”).
48. See Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A2d 756, 760 (requiring that the plaintiff notify the
anonymous individual by posting a message of notification on the same message board from
which the claim arose).
49. See Cahill, 884 A.2d at 457 (Warning of a “sue first, ask questions later” approach, that
coupled with a standard only minimally protective of the anonymity of defendants, will
discourage debate on important issues of public concern as more and more anonymous posters
censor their online statements in response to the likelihood of being unmasked).
50. See infra Part III.C.
51. See infra Part III.A.
52. See infra Part III.B.
53. See infra Part III.B.1.
54. See infra Part III.B.2.
55. See infra Part III.B.3.
VOL. 6 NO. 1 2011

203

M’ P B

courts when attempting to balance the First Amendment right to anonymity
with an individual’s right to protect their reputation.56
A. Defamation: An Overview
The First Amendment right to anonymity does not apply in cases of
defamation.57 In order for a statement to be considered defamation under
Maryland law, the plaintiff must show: “(1) that the defendant made a
defamatory statement to a third person, (2) that the statement was false, (3)
that the defendant was legally at fault in making the statement, and (4) that
the plaintiff thereby suffered harm.”58 Maryland defines a defamatory
statement as a statement of fact that “tends to expose a person to public
scorn, hatred, contempt or ridicule, thereby discouraging others in the
community from having a good opinion of, or associating with, that
person.”59 The plaintiff must establish each of the four elements of a
defamation claim by clear and convincing evidence, and must establish that
the defendant acted at least negligently when making the statement.60 If a
court finds that a defendant’s statement is defamatory, and the other three
elements of defamation are established, then it will refuse to extend the
protections of the First Amendment to that statement and the defendant is
exposed to liability.61 For example, in Jacron Sales Co., Inc. v. Sindorf,62 a
plaintiff sued his former employer for false statements that his former
employer made to a new employer, which prevented the plaintiff from
obtaining a job with the new employer.63 The Maryland Court of Appeals
found the former employer guilty of defamation where he published a false
56. See infra Part III.C.
57. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 245–46 (2002) (finding that as a general
principle, the First Amendment does not protect defamatory statements). See also Chaplinsky v.
State of New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 569, 72, 74 (1942) (finding that when appellee said the
words “[y]ou are a God damned racketeer” and “a damned Fascist and the whole government of
Rochester are Fascists or agents of Fascists,” his speech was no longer protected by the First
Amendment because such words are “no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such
slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.”).
58. Offen v. Brenner, 935 A.2d 719, 723–24 (Md. 2007); see also Jacron Sales Co., Inc. v.
Sindorf, 350 A.2d 688, 697–98 (Md. 1976) (finding that a plaintiff must prove these elements to a
negligence standard).
59. Offen, 935 A.2d at 724 (quoting Gohari v. Darvish, 767 A.2d 321, 327 (2001)).
60. Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d 230, 249 (Md. 1997)
61. See, e.g., Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571–72 (finding that defamatory speech is not protected
by the First Amendment). See also, Nolan v. Campbell, 690 N.W. 2d 638, 652 (Neb. Ct. App.
2004) (finding that libelous speech is not protected under the First Amendment).
62. 350 A.2d 688 (Md. 1976).
63. Id.
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defamatory statement concerning a private person, and he knew, recklessly
disregarded, or negligently failed to ascertain, that the statement was false
and defamed the other plaintiff.64
B. The Internet is a Unique Forum to which the Rules of Traditional
Defamation Claims May Not Apply
The Internet is a unique forum for social interaction for many reasons and
this uniqueness may change the way that defamation laws are applied.65
First, there are unique aspects of the Internet that give it enormous potential
as a forum of public discourse.66 Second, the Internet provides an extrajudicial remedy available to potential plaintiffs who are defamed on the
Internet that is not available to potential plaintiffs who are defamed in other
mediums.67 Finally, the same technology that makes the Internet a unique
forum for public discourse opens the door to potential abuses of the legal
process.68
1. Courts Recognize the Internet’s Potential as a Forum for Public
Discourse
The emergence of the Internet has changed the landscape of free speech by
giving people “a voice that resonates farther than it could from any
soapbox.”69 And with the Internet’s ubiquitous nature and prominence in
today’s culture, it has all but replaced the more traditional forums for
debate.70 When presented with cases involving free speech and the Internet,
courts point out the vital role that the Internet plays in the ongoing dialogue
of human thought.71 While courts recognize that the Internet would not be
as successful as it is at facilitating public discourse if it did not allow people
64. Id. at 697–98.
65. See infra. Part III.B.
66. See infra. Part III.B.1.
67. See infra. Part III.B.2.
68. See infra. Part III.B.3.
69. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (discussing whether the Communications
Decency Act violates the First Amendment as overbroad).
70. See Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 456 (Del. 2005) (discussing the reach of the Internet: “A
person in Alaska can have a conversation with a person in Japan about beekeeping in Bangladesh,
just as easily as several Smyrna residents can have a conversation about Smyrna politics.”).
71. See In re Does 1-10, 242 S.W.3d 805, 820 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007) (“Internet anonymity
serves a particularly vital role in the exchange of ideas and robust debate on matters of public
concern.”). See also, Doe v. 2THEMART.COM, 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1092 (W.D. Wash. 2001)
(“The ‘ability to speak one’s mind’ on the Internet ‘without the burden of the other party knowing
all the facts about one’s identity can foster open communication and robust debate.’”) (quoting
Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 578 (N.D.Cal. 1999)).
VOL. 6 NO. 1 2011
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to interact anonymously,72 courts are also aware that the informal nature of
the Internet and the ability for anyone to participate in the debate,
sometimes causes the discourse to digress into “cyber-smear.”73 The
California Court of Appeals noted that on the Internet:
[U]sers are able to engage freely in informal debate and
criticism, leading many to substitute gossip for accurate
reporting and often to adopt a provocative, even combative
tone. . . . [O]nline discussions may look more like a vehicle for
emotional catharsis than a forum for the rapid exchange of
information and ideas.74
Even with the benefits that anonymity brings to public discourse on
the Internet, courts recognize that there are situations where anonymity is
abused, and therefore, not extended.75 Specifically, courts recognize that
the anonymity that the Internet offers opens the door to libel and other
tortuous conduct.76 Courts also recognize that the effects of such tortuous
conduct spread much faster and farther because of the nature of the
Internet.77 In Krinsky v. Doe 6,78 for example, the California Court of
Appeals found that “[t]he fact that many Internet speakers employ online
pseudonyms tends to heighten [the] sense that ‘anything goes,’ and some
commentators have likened cyberspace to a frontier society free from the
conventions and constraints that limit discourse in the real world.”79

72. See 2THEMART.COM, 140 F. Supp. 2d at 1093 (“The free exchange of ideas on the
Internet is driven in large part by the ability of Internet users to communicate anonymously.”).
73. See Krinsky v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231, 238 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (discussing how the
casual nature of the Internet often leads conversation in Internet forums to look more like vehicles
for emotional catharsis than forums for a rapid exchange of intelligent ideas).
74. Id. (citing Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse in
Cyberspace 49 DUKE L. J. 855, 863 (2000)).
75. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (finding that the First
Amendment does not protect lewd, obscene, profane, or libelous speech); see also Krinsky, 72
Cal. Rptr. 3d at 238 (finding that anonymity on the Internet tends to lead to a discourse that is, for
better or worse, free from the tradition societal constraints and covenants).
76. Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 238.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 231.
79. Id. at 238. (quoting Lidsky, supra note 74, at 863. In Krinsky, a corporate president
brought suit against ten anonymous defendants for allegedly defamatory statements posted on
Internet sites under pseudonyms. Id. at 235. In connection with the suit, plaintiff served a
subpoena on a California ISP to discover the true identity of each of the ten John Doe Defendants.
Id. John Doe number 6 moved to quash the subpoena. Id. The trial court denied Defendant’s
motion, but the California appellate court reversed. Id. at 236, 251
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2. The Nature of the Internet Provides Plaintiffs with a Remedy that is
Independent of the Court System
The Internet allows people to anonymously communicate with a large
audience instantly through various forums and message boards.80 While this
ease of communication can foster great debate, it may also lead to abuses
and conversations that resemble little more than verbal mud-slinging.81
When the conversation turns sour and people post defamatory statements on
the Internet, the Internet allows people to instantly respond to those
defamatory statements and take away some of the negative impact of those
statements.82 By giving people the ability to respond directly to a
defamatory statement, the Internet provides people with a remedy that is
independent of the court system.83
Courts encourage potential plaintiffs to take advantage of the unique
features of the Internet and use remedies that keep potential litigants out of
the courtroom.84 A majority of the states that have developed tests to
determine whether or not to enforce a subpoena ordering the discovery of
the identity of an anonymous Internet forum participant accused of
defamation require plaintiffs to attempt to notify the defendant of their
intention to discover his identity.85 Many of these same courts encourage
the plaintiff to notify the defendant on the same Internet forum where the
defamation occurred.86
Courts that require notification argue that by giving notice, potential
plaintiffs may be able to resolve disputes before they have to bring suit.87 In
Doe v. Cahill,88 for example, the Supreme Court of Delaware found that the
80. See Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 456 (Del. 2005) (discussing the reach of the Internet: “A
person in Alaska can have a conversation with a person in Japan about beekeeping in Bangladesh,
just as easily as several Smyrna residents can have a conversation about Smyrna politics.”).
81. See Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 238 (discussing how the casual nature of the Internet
often leads conversation in Internet forums to look more like vehicles for emotional catharsis than
forums for a rapid exchange of intelligent ideas).
82. See, e.g., Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756, 760 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001)
(requiring that the plaintiff notify the anonymous individual by posting a message of notification
on the same message board from which the claim arose).
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe, 170 P.3d 712, 721 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (requiring that
the plaintiff undertake efforts to notify the anonymous posters that they are the subject of a
subpoena or application for an order of the disclosure).
85. Id.; Krinsky, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 244; Cahill, 884 A.2d at 460; Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 760.
86. See, e.g., Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 760 (requiring that the plaintiff notify the anonymous
individual by posting a message of notification on the same message board from which the claim
arose).
87. Cahill, 884 A.2d at 464.
88. 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005).
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unique nature of the Internet allows a potential defendant the opportunity to
mitigate, and even eliminate, the damage caused by a defamatory statement
without involving the court system.89 The Cahill court found that:
[a] person wronged by statements of an anonymous poster can
respond instantly. . . to the allegedly defamatory statements on
the same site or blog, and thus, can, almost contemporaneously,
respond to the same audience that initially read the allegedly
defamatory statements. The plaintiff can thereby easily correct
any misstatements or falsehoods, respond to character attacks,
and generally set the record straight.90
Courts that require notification find that attempting notice is neither
burdensome nor inequitable, and hold that unless notice is attempted, a
subpoena ordering the discovery of an anonymous Internet forum
participant will not be enforced.91
Courts that do not require notification point to the difficulty a plaintiff
may encounter in notifying defendant.92 But even those courts require a
showing of the steps taken to locate the defendant.93 For example, in
Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com,94 the United States District Court for
the Northern District of California considered the defendant’s right to
anonymity in relation to the plaintiff’s right to recover damages stemming
from a trademark infringement claim.95 Although Seescandy.com did not

89. Id. at 464.
90. Id.
91. See, e.g., Krinsky v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231, 244 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (requiring
attempted notification and finding it not unduly burdensome).
92. See, e.g., Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 578 (N.D. Cal. 1999)
(“Parties who have been injured . . . are likely to find themselves chasing the tortfeasor from
Internet Service Provider (ISP) to ISP, with little or no hope of actually discovering the identity of
the tortfeasor.”); see generally In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online, Inc., 2000 WL
1210372 (2000) (making no mention of a requirement of notice in its analysis).
93. See Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. at 579 (requiring that the party seeking relief identify all
previous steps taken to locate the elusive defendant).
94. Id. at 573.
95. Id. In Seescandy.com, the plaintiff was the assignee of various trademark related to the
operation of “See’s Candy Shops, Inc.” and sought an injunction against the defendant who had
registered the Internet domain name “seescandy.com.” Id. at 575. The essence of plaintiff’s claim
was that by registering the domain name “seescandy.com,” defendant had infringed on plaintiff’s
trademark. Id. The case, however, got stuck in a mire of pre-trial motions because defendant had
registered the domain name under a pseudonym and plaintiff was unable to ascertain the true
identity of the defendant. Id. Plaintiff then moved the court to grant the discovery of defendant’s
true identity so that plaintiff could serve process. Id. at 577.
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implicate the defendant’s First Amendment rights, the California court
recognized the unique circumstances created by the advent of the Internet
and established a test for California to use when deciding issues relating to
the exposure of the identity of once anonymous defendants.96 The court
found that the plaintiff need not actually serve the defendant before
discovering the defendant’s business records, but the plaintiff must identify
all steps previously taken to locate the defendant.97 In so finding, the court
reasoned that by requiring the plaintiff to identify the steps taken to notify
the defendant, the court is ensuring that the plaintiff is issuing his subpoena
in good faith.98
3. The Technology of the Internet Enables Potential Plaintiffs to Identify
Potential Defendants with Relative Ease and Opens the Door to Potential
Abuses of the Legal Process
While the technology behind the Internet enables people to anonymously
interact on a global scale, the same technology enables anyone to discover
the true identity of people interacting on the Internet.99 One way to identify
an anonymous individual interacting on the Internet is through Internet
Protocol (“IP”) Tracing.100 The Delaware Supreme Court explained the
mechanics of IP Tracing in its decision in Cahill.101 When an individual
connects to the Internet, his computer is assigned a unique number called an
IP Address.102 IP Addresses are essential to the functioning of the Internet
because they allow computers to communicate with each other and tell
servers where to send information.103 For example, when a person visits a
website, his computer sends code to back and forth to another computer, the
two computers would not be able to communicate with each other without
knowing where they were sending the code.104 Most IP addresses are
owned, not by the individual accessing the Internet, but by the company
providing the access the Internet Service Provider (“ISP”).105 The ISP

96. Id. at 578–79.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 579.
99. See supra notes 69–79 and accompanying text.
100. Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 454–55 (Del. 2005).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 454.
103. See What is an IP Address? KIOSKEA.NET http://en kioskea net/contents/Internet/ip.php3
(last visited Jan. 13, 2011). See also 3COM, Understanding IP Addressing: Everything You Ever
Wanted to Know, 2–7. (2001).
104. 3com, Understanding IP Addressing: Everything You Ever Wanted to Know, 2–7 (2001).
105. Cahill, 884 A.2d at 454.
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assigns a unique IP address to each individual computer for the period of
time that that computer is accessing the Internet.106
If a plaintiff wants to discover the true identity of a person who
defamed him, the plaintiff starts with the website on which the defamatory
information was posted.107 The host of the website will have a list of IP
addresses that posted content to (and even that accessed) their website.108
From that list of IP addresses, the plaintiff will be able to identify the IP
address of the person who defamed him.109 A simple Google search of the
IP address will reveal that person’s ISP.110 If the ISP knows the time and
date of the defamatory postings were made from a specific IP address, it can
determine the identity of its subscriber.111
As the technology that enables discovery of true identities has become
more readily accessible, courts have imposed higher burdens on plaintiffs
seeking such discovery.112 None of the technology described above existed
at the time of Talley v. California,113 or when Alexander Hamilton
published the Federalist Papers under his famous pseudonym “Publius.”114
Previous defamation cases involved statements published in print media
which, once published, were difficult to trace back to their author.115 In
Talley, the Supreme Court struck down a California law that prohibited
circulation of handbills that did not include the names and addresses of the
people who sponsored them.116 In so holding, the Court emphasized the
importance that anonymity has played in history, 117 and the lengths that
106. Id. at 454–55.
107. Id. at 454.
108. Id. at 455.
109. Id.
110. Anyone can obtain the IP address for their computer by visiting
http://whatismyipaddress.com/. This website will reveal not only an individual’s IP address, but
their ISP.
111. Cahill, 884 A.2d at 455.
112. Compare In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc., 2000 WL 1210372, at *8
(Va. Cir. Ct. 2000) (applying a “good faith” test), with Cahill, 884 A.2d at 460 (applying a
summary judgment standard).
113. 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
114. The Federalist Papers were published anonymously under the name “Publius.” See
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 343 n.6 (1995).
115. See, e.g., Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64–65 (1960).
116. Id. at 65.
117. Id. at 64.
Anonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and even books have played an important
role in the progress of mankind. Persecuted groups and sects from time to time
throughout history have been able to criticize oppressive practices and laws either
anonymously or not at all. The obnoxious press licensing law of England, which was
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corrupt authorities would go to discover the identity of anonymous
publishers of controversial leaflets.118
The Internet has changed the landscape of anonymous speech
jurisprudence because identification of defamatory Internet users is easier
than the identification of an anonymous publisher of a flyer.119 With the
ease of identification, courts recognize the potential for abuses.120 The
Delaware Supreme Court recognized in Cahill that once anonymity is
destroyed, it can never be restored.121 The Cahill court’s decision was
guided by the concern that the revelation of the identity of an anonymous
speaker “may subject [that speaker] to ostracism for expressing unpopular
ideas, [or] invite retaliation from those who oppose her ideas. . . .”122 These
types of extra-judicial remedies give courts pause when evaluating whether
to permit discovery.123 The New Jersey Superior Court emphasized the
danger of allowing someone to easily discover the identity of an anonymous
person when it noted that “[p]eople who have committed no wrong should
be able to participate online without fear that someone who wishes to harass
or embarrass them can file a frivolous lawsuit and thereby gain the power of
the court’s order to discover their identity.”124

also enforced on the Colonies was due in part to the knowledge that exposure of the
names of printers, writers and distributors would lessen the circulation of literature
critical of the government.
Id.
118. Id. at 64–65
The old seditious libel cases in England show the lengths to which government had to
go to find out who was responsible for books that were obnoxious to the rulers. John
Lilburne was whipped, pilloried and fined for refusing to answer questions designed to
get evidence to convict him or someone else for the secret distribution of books in
England. Two Puritan Ministers, John Penry and John Udal, were sentenced to death on
charges that they were responsible for writing, printing or publishing books. Before the
Revolutionary War colonial patriots frequently had to conceal their authorship or
distribution of literature that easily could have brought down on them prosecutions by
English-controlled courts. Along about that time the Letters of Junius were written and
the identity of their author is unknown to this day. Even the Federalist Papers, written
in favor of the adoption of our Constitution, were published under fictitious names. It is
plain that anonymity has sometimes been assumed for the most constructive purposes.
Id.
119. Compare Talley, 362 U.S. at 64–65, with Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756, 767
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
120. Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 457 (Del. 2005).
121. Id. at 457.
122. Id. (internal citations omitted).
123. Id.
124. Dendrite Int’l, 775 A.2d at 767 (quoting Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D.
573, 578 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
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C. Courts Have not Agreed to a Uniform Burden of Proof for Discovering
the Identity of an Anonymous Internet Forum Participant
There is no uniform burden of proof that courts require before they will
enforce a subpoena to discover the identity of an anonymous Internet forum
participant.125 In cases where a court is presented with competing interests
of the First Amendment right to anonymity and protection against
defamation, burdens of proof range from a very low good faith basis
standard,126 to a moderate motion to dismiss standard,127 to a demanding
prima facie / summary judgment standard.128
1. Good Faith Basis Standard
States that apply the good-faith basis standard require that a plaintiff only
show “that the party requesting the subpoena has a legitimate, good faith
basis to contend that [he] may be the victim of conduct actionable in the
jurisdiction where suit was filed.”129 In In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to
America Online, Inc., [hereinafter “AOL”],130 the Virginia Circuit Court
adopted a three-part test and held that a court should only order a non-party,
ISP to provide information concerning the identity of a subscriber when:

125. See generally, Nathaniel Gleicher, Note, John Doe Subpoenas: Toward a Consistent
Legal Standard, 118 YALE L. J. 320 (2008) (discussing the various burdens that courts impose
when considering a subpoena to discover the identity of an anonymous Internet forum
participant).
126. Virginia and Washington require that a plaintiff show a good faith reason for requesting
the true identity of an Internet user that he accuses of defamation. In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to
America Online, Inc., 2000 WL 1210372, at *8 (2000); Doe v. 2THEMART.COM, Inc., 140 F.
Supp. 2d 1088, 1095 (W.D. Wash. 2001). See infra Part III.C.1.
127. California, New Jersey, North Carolina, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania require a
plaintiff to plead a prima facie claim before they will enforce a subpoena ordering the disclosure
of an Internet user’s identity. Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. Cal.
1999); London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F.Supp.2d 153, 164 (D. Mass. 2008).; Alvis
Coastings, Inc. v. John Does 1-10, 2004 WL 2904405, at *3 (W.D.N.C. 2004); Dendrite Int’l, Inc.
v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756, 760 (N.J. App. Div. 2001); Public Relations Soc. of America, Inc. v. Road
Runner High Speed Online, 799 N.Y.S.2d 847, 853 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005);
Polito v. AOL Time Warner, Inc., 2004 WL 3768897, *7 (Pa.D. & C. 2004). See infra Part
III.C.2.
128. Delaware, Arizona, Nevada, New York, and Washington, D.C. require that plaintiff
support his claim with enough evidence to survive a motion for summary judgment. Solers, Inc. v.
Doe, 977 A.2d 941, 945 (2009); Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe, 170 P.3d 712 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007); Doe v.
Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 460 (Del. 2005); Quixtar Inc. v. Signature Mgmt. Team, LLC, 566
F.Supp.2d 1205, 1216 (D. Nev. 2008). See infra Part III.C.3.
129. In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc., 2000 WL 1210372, at *8 (2000).
130. Id.
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(1) [T]he court is satisfied by the pleadings or evidence supplied
to th[e] court; (2) [] the party requesting subpoena has a
‘legitimate, good faith basis’ to contend that it may be the victim
of [actionable] conduct . . .; and (3) the subpoenaed identity
information is centrally needed to advance th[e] claim.131
In applying this test, the court found that there is a compelling state
interest in protecting plaintiffs from the “potentially severe consequences
that could easily flow from actionable communications on the information
superhighway,” that significantly outweighs a limited intrusion on the First
Amendment rights of any innocent Internet forum participants.132 The
court, therefore, ordered AOL to reveal the identity of five anonymous
Internet forum participants who posted various defamatory material
misrepresentations about the plaintiff.133 In so ordering, the court found that
based on a reading of the chat room postings,134 there was a good faith
basis for the plaintiff’s allegations, and the identity of the defendants was
needed to pursue those allegations.135
2. Motion to Dismiss Standard
Some states require that the plaintiff “establish to the Court’s satisfaction
that plaintiff’s suit against defendant could withstand a motion to
dismiss.”136 In Seescandy.com.,137 the United States District Court for the
131. Id. In AOL, Plaintiff Anonymous Publicly Traded Company (“APTC”) sought to discover
the identities of five anonymous AOL users who had posted allegedly defamatory material
misrepresentations to Internet chat rooms under pseudonyms. Id. Seeking to protect the anonymity
of its subscribers, AOL refused to comply with the discovery request and filed a motion to quash
the subpoena. Id. In ruling on AOL’s motion, the Virginia Circuit Court applied the three-part test
set forth above, and denied AOL’s motion to quash. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. The Complaint did not set forth or describe the content of any of the allegedly tortuous
messages, did not state where on the Internet the referenced “Chat Rooms” were located, and did
not identify any of the screen names under which the messages were supposedly posted. See Brief
of Appellant at *7, Am. Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 2000 WL 34613057 at
*7 (Va. 2000) (No. 000974) (referencing the contents of the complaint).
135. In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 2000 WL 1210372, at *8 (2000).
136. Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 579 (N.D.Cal. 1999). To survive a
motion to dismiss, the plaintiff need not produce enough evidence to win at trial, but he must put
forth enough evidence to survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which
relief may be granted. Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 640 (9th Cir. 1980). In considering a
motion to dismiss, the general rule is that a complaint should not be dismissed on the pleadings
“unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim
which would entitle him to relief.” Id. (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957).
137. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. at 573.
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Northern District of California developed its test for balancing the
competing interests between a plaintiff and an anonymous defendant.138 In
Seescandy.com, the court found four criteria that when met, “will ensure
that this unusual procedure will only be employed in cases where the
plaintiff has in good faith exhausted traditional avenues for identifying a
civil defendant pre-service, and will prevent use of this method to harass or
intimidate.”139 The Seescandy.com test requires that a plaintiff: (1) identify
the missing party with enough specificity so that the Court can determine
that the defendant is a real person or entity who is subject to personal
jurisdiction;140 (2) identify all previous steps taken to locate the elusive
defendant;141 (3) establish to the Court’s satisfaction that plaintiff’s suit
against defendant could withstand a motion to dismiss;142 and (4) file a
discovery request with the Court.143 The Seescandy.com court found that
the plaintiff had demonstrated enough evidence that its trademark
infringement claim could survive a motion to dismiss.144 Specifically, the
court found that plaintiff had satisfied the test for infringement of a
federally registered trademark because they had shown in their complaint145
that the allegedly infringing act “creates a likelihood of confusion.”146

138. Id. at 578–80.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 578–79. The court found that plaintiff’s complaint had properly identified the
missing party with enough specificity to satisfy this first requirement. Id.
141. Id. at 579. The court found that plaintiff had satisfied this element by calling the two nondirectory information services telephone numbers listed on the seescandy.com website and serving
all relevant pre-trial documents to the e-mail addresses associated with the domains registered by
the people who registered seescandy.com. Id.
142. Id. at 579–80. The court found that plaintiff satisfied this element by satisfying the test for
infringement of a federally registered trademark for false designation of origin under the Lanham
Act. Id.
143. Id. at 580.
144. Id.
145. Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, Complaint, 1999 WL 34760595.
Paragraph 28 avers,
On information and belief, COLUMBIA and SEE'S CANDY aver that Defendants
adopted and use the identical SEE'S MARKS and the virtually identical
SEESCANDY.COM and SEESCANDYS.COM Internet addresses with full knowledge
of Plaintiff's SEE'S MARKS for the purpose and with the intent to cause confusion
among the purchasing public and to deceive and mislead the purchasing public.
Id. at ¶ 28.
Paragraph 33 avers, “Defendants' use of the identical SEE'S MARKS and the virtually identical
SEESCANDY.COM and SEESCANDYS.COM Internet address constitutes a direct imitation of
Plaintiff's SEE'S MARKS, and the use thereof in connection with Defendants' sale of candy is
likely to cause further confusion of and deception among the purchasing public.” Id. at ¶ 33.
146. Seescandy, 185 F.R.D. at 580.
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Specifically, the court cited to emails from confused consumers147 and
defendants’ desire to sell the domain names back to See’s Candy,148 as
evidence that defendants intentionally infringed on plaintiff’s trademark.149
Based on this finding, and the satisfaction of the other elements of its test,
the court granted plaintiff’s discovery request to identify the anonymous
defendant.150
3. Prima Facie Case / Summary Judgment Standard
States that require a prima facie showing/summary judgment proof require
that “to obtain discovery of an anonymous defendant’s identity . . . a
defamation plaintiff ‘must submit sufficient evidence to establish a prima
facie case for each essential element of the claim in question.’”151 In order
to prove a prima facie case for defamation, the plaintiff must introduce
evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact for each essential
element.152
Some jurisdictions use a balancing test in conjunction with this prima
facie standard.153 In Dendrite International Inc. v. Doe,154 the New Jersey
Superior Court Appellate Division used the summary judgment test as part
of a four part test when considering how to balance the competing interests
between a defamation plaintiff and an anonymous defendant.155 The
Dendrite test requires plaintiffs to: (1) undertake an effort to notify the
anonymous poster, including posting notice to the message board where the
alleged defamation occurred, and withhold action to afford the anonymous
an opportunity to respond to the claim; (2) set forth the exact statements
that are alleged to be defamatory; (3) satisfy the prima facie or summary
judgment standard; and (4) after the first three criteria are satisfied, the
court must “balance the defendant’s First Amendment right of anonymous
free speech against the strength of the prima facie case presented and the

147. Id. At hearing, Plaintiff produced 31 emails that Defendant had received from consumers
seeking to purchase See’s Candy from defendant’s website. Id.
148. Id. The court found that Defendants desire to sell the two domains back to See's Candy
combined with the use of See's trademark logos, was a sign that defendants intended to trade on
the goodwill associated with the See's marks.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 463 (Del. 2005) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in
original).
152. Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756, 772 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
153. Id.
154. 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
155. Id. at 760–61.
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necessity for the disclosure of the anonymous defendant’s identity to allow
the plaintiff to properly proceed.”156
The Dendrite Court applied this test when examining the appropriate
procedures to be followed and the standards to be applied by New Jersey
courts in evaluating subpoenas to discover of the identity of anonymous
users of ISP message boards.157 In Dendrite, the plaintiff Corporation
served an ISP with a subpoena demanding the discovery of the identity of
anonymous individuals who had allegedly defamed the plaintiff.158 The
court applied its four-part test and found that the plaintiff fell short of the
summary judgment standard the test requires because plaintiff failed to
establish the harm that was caused by the alleged defamation.159 In so
finding, the court noted that Dendrite had met the motion to dismiss
standard for defamation,160 but held that Dendrite had failed the summary
judgment standard because they failed to show harm.161 Thus, the Dendrite
court did not reach the balancing component of their four-part test.162
Other jurisdictions have applied the Dendrite test without the
balancing test.163 In Cahill, the Delaware Supreme Court found that the
summary judgment test is itself the balancing test, and that the fourth
requirement of the Dendrite test adds no protection above and beyond the

156. Id. To prove a prima facie case, the plaintiff must prove enough evidence that he would
prevail in a motion for summary judgment if his motion was unopposed. Cahill, at 464.
157. Dendrite Int’l , Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756, 759 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
158. Id. at 760.
159. Id. at 760, 770–72. Specifically, the court found that Dendrite had not established that the
fluctuations in its stock prices were the direct result of Defendant’s postings. Id. at 772.
On three of the days that immediately followed a posting by John Doe No. 3,
Dendrite's stock value decreased. However, on five of the days that immediately
followed a posting by John Doe No. 3, Dendrite's stock value increased. The net
change in Dendrite's stock value over those seven days was actually an increase of
3 and 5/8 points.
Id.
160. Id.
Here, Dendrite has (1) identified the ‘revenue recognition’ and ‘shopping’ statements as
purportedly defamatory words, (2) identified ‘xxplrr’ (John Doe No. 3) as the utterer,
and (3) established that they were in fact published on Yahoo!’s bulletin board.
Accordingly, Dendrite meets the bare minimum requirements for a defamation cause of
action, and would survive a motion to dismiss under the traditional application of R.
4:6-2(e).
Id.
161. Id. at 772.
162. Id.
163. Doe v. Cahill, 844 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005); Maxon v. Ottawa Pub. Co., 929 N.E.2d 666,
676 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010).

216

JOURNAL OF BUSINESS & TECHNOLOGY LAW

B D

first three requirements.164 The Cahill court also found that the extra
balancing test at the end of the Dendrite test needlessly complicated the
analysis.165 Indeed, once the Dendrite court found that plaintiff’s claim
failed the summary judgment prong of its test, the court stopped its analysis
and did not apply the balancing test.166 Similarly, the Illinois Appellate
Court found that the balancing test between a First Amendment right and a
statutory right really isn’t a balancing test because the scales necessarily tip
toward the First Amendment right.167
IV. The Court’s Reasoning

In Independent Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie,168 the Court of Appeals of
Maryland reversed the judgment of the Circuit Court for Queen Anne’s
County and held that the circuit court had abused its discretion when
ordering the identification of the five John Does because Brodie failed to
plead a valid cause of action against any defendant.169 Writing for the
majority, Judge Battaglia determined that the trial judge had dismissed the
cause of action against the three John Doe Defendants, and the one year
statute of limitations barred plaintiff from bringing any action in defamation
against the two Unnamed Offenders who posted defamatory statements
about the unsanitary conditions of plaintiff’s restaurant.170 The Court of
Appeals, therefore, held that because plaintiff’s only possible cause of
action was barred by the statute of limitations, the circuit court abused its
discretion when it ordered Independent Newspapers to identify the five
John Does.171

164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 772.
167. Maxon, 929 N.E.2d at 676 (“[O]nce the petitioner has made out a prima facie case for
defamation, the potential defendant has no first-amendment right to balance against the petitioner's
right to seek redress for damage to his reputation, as it is well settled that there is no firstamendment right to defame.”).
168. 966 A.2d 432 (2009).
169. Id. at 447.
170. Id. at 449 (citing MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-105 (2002) (“An action for
assault, libel, or slander shall be filed within one year from the date it accrues.”)).
171. Id. at 447–48.
[T]he abuse of discretion standard [provides that] the trial court abused its discretion
where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the [trial] court [ ] . . . or
when the court acts without reference to any guiding principles, and the ruling under
consideration is clearly against the logic and effect of facts and inferences before the
court[ ] . . . or when the ruling is violative of fact and logic.
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After quickly disposing of the circuit court’s ruling below, Judge
Battaglia used the Brodie case to guide Maryland’s lower courts and
establish the standard to apply when balancing an individual’s First
Amendment right to speak anonymously on the Internet against a plaintiff’s
right to seek judicial redress for defamation.172 Judge Battaglia recognized
that the well settled First Amendment right to speak anonymously173
applies to the Internet with equal force.174 However, the court recognized
that this right is limited by defamation considerations, and a defendant’s
right to free speech on the Internet and must be balanced against a
plaintiff’s right to protect his reputation.175 Seeking to find a test that would
appropriately balance these competing interests, the court analyzed tests
applied by other state courts in similar situations.176 The Court found that
the “good faith basis” test used by the Virginia Circuit Court in In re
Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online, Inc.,177 would inhibit the use of
the Internet as a marketplace of ideas, whereas the summary judgment
standard used by the Supreme Court of Delaware in Cahill, would
“undermine personal accountability and the search for truth, by requiring
claimants to essentially prove their case before knowing who the
commentator was.”178

Id. (citing Beyond Sys., Inc. v. Realtime Gaming Holding Co., LLC, 878 A.2d 567, 583–84
(Md. 2005)).
172. Id. at 447.
173. Id. at 440–41. Both the Supreme Court and the Maryland Court of Appeals have
recognized that the First Amendment protects the right of an individual to speak anonymously. Id.
(citing McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 341–42 (1995) (“[A]n author’s
decision to remain anonymous . . . is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the First
Amendment.”) (citing Lubin v. Agora, Inc., 882 A.2d 833, 846 (Md. 2005) (finding that the
anonymity of a subscriber to a publication is protected under the First Amendment.)).
174. Id. at 442 “[P]rotections under the First Amendment have been extended to the Internet by
various federal courts and courts in our sister states” (citing Sony Music Entm’t, Inc. v. Does 140, 326 F. Supp. 2d 556, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)).
175. Id. at 441 (citing Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952)).
176. Id. at 449–56.
177. 2000 WL 1210372, at *8 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2000).
178. Brodie, 966 A.2d at 454.
The lower ‘good faith basis’ or ‘motion to dismiss’ thresholds, articulated by our sister
courts in AOL, 52 Va. Cir. at 37, and Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. at 579, would inhibit
the use of the Internet as a marketplace of ideas, where boundaries for participation in
public discourse melt away, and anyone with access to a computer can speak to an
audience ‘larger and more diverse than any [of] the Framers could have imagined.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
Setting the bar too high, on the other hand, to require plaintiffs to meet a summary
judgment standard, “that there is no genuine dispute of material fact and that the party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,” would undermine personal accountability
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Recognizing that setting too low a threshold would limit free speech
on the Internet, and that setting too high a standard could prohibit a plaintiff
from bring a valid (but not bulletproof) cause of action for defamation, the
court sought a middle ground in a five-part test.179 Judge Battaglia’s fivepart test for issuing a subpoena revealing an Internet poster’s identity,
which combined features of the Dendrite180 and Cahill181 tests, provides:
[W]hen a trial court is confronted with a defamation action in
which anonymous speakers or pseudonyms are involved, it
should, (1) require the plaintiff to undertake efforts to notify the
anonymous posters that they are the subject of a subpoena or
application for an order of disclosure, including posting a
message of notification of the identity discovery request on the
message board; (2) withhold action to afford the anonymous
posters a reasonable opportunity to file and serve opposition to
the application; (3) require the plaintiff to identify and set forth
the exact statements purportedly made by each anonymous
poster, alleged to constitute actionable speech; (4) determine
whether the complaint has set forth a prima facie defamation per
se or per quod action against the anonymous posters; and (5), if
all else is satisfied, balance the anonymous poster’s First
Amendment right to free speech against the strength of the prima
facie case of defamation presented by the plaintiff and the
necessity for disclosure of the anonymous defendant’s identity,
prior to ordering disclosure.182
Judge Adkins wrote a concurring opinion agreeing with the holding of
the case and the first four elements of Judge Battaglia’s five-part test, but
disagreeing with the majority’s inclusion of the fifth element balancing
test.183 Arguing that defamation occurs more frequently and more visibly
on the Internet than via more traditional mediums, Judge Adkins disagreed
with the majority’s balancing test as “unnecessary and needlessly
complicated.”184 Judge Adkins reasoned that the prima facie case element
and the search for truth, by requiring claimants to essentially prove their case before
even knowing who the commentator was.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
179. Id.
180. Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756, 760–61 (N.J. App. Div. 2001).
181. Cahill, 884 A.2d at 461.
182. Brodie, 966 A.2d at 457 (emphasis in original).
183. Id. at 457–59 (Adkins, J., concurring).
184. Id. at 458.
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of the majority’s test is itself a “balancing test,” and there is no need for an
additional balancing test.185 Judge Adkins concluded that the fifth-element
balancing test adopted by the majority gives a trial court the authority to
decide that a plaintiff’s cause of action shall not go forward, even though it
satisfies the other four elements of the Brodie test, because the court has
decided that defendant’s interests are greater than the plaintiff’s.186 Judge
Adkins feared that the majority’s fifth-element balancing test “invites the
lower courts to apply, on an ad hoc basis, a ‘superlaw’ of Internet
defamation that can trump the well-established defamation law.”187
V.

Analysis

In Independent Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie,188 the Court of Appeals of
Maryland established the standard for Maryland Courts to follow when
balancing an individual’s First Amendment right to speak anonymously on
the Internet against a plaintiff’s right to seek judicial redress for
defamation.189 In this case of first impression, the Court developed a fivepart test consisting of: (1) notice; (2) opportunity to respond; (3) identifying
the exact statements alleged to be defamatory; (4) prima facie proof of the
allegations; and (5) a balancing test.190 In developing its test, the Court
properly encouraged potential plaintiffs and defendants to resolve disputes
within the public forum.191 The Brodie Court’s test also set the proper
burden of proof for a plaintiff to meet before the court will enforce a
subpoena to discover the identity of an anonymous Internet forum
participant.192 The Brodie Court’s inclusion of a balancing component,
however, causes its test to fall short of the Court’s stated goal of
establishing a clear standard for the lower courts to follow.193 By subjecting
the outcome of cases to a great deal of judicial discretion, the Brodie test
blurs the line between defamation and legitimate discourse and if upheld
and applied by other states, the Brodie test will hinder the development of

185. See id. (“The summary judgment test is itself the balance. The [balancing test] adds no
protection above and beyond that of the summary judgment test and needlessly complicates the
analysis.”) (citing Cahill, 884 A.2d at 461.
186. Id. at 459.
187. Id.
188. 966 A.2d 432 (Md. 2009).
189. Id. at 457.
190. Id.
191. See infra Part IV.A.
192. See infra Part IV.B.
193. See infra Part IV.C.
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the Internet and may keep it from reaching its potential as a truly credible
public forum.194
A. The Brodie Test’s Notification and Withholding Requirements Properly
Encourage Plaintiffs and Defendants to Resolve Potential Problems within
the Public Forum
By including notification195 and withholding196 requirements, the Brodie
court’s test is true to the spirit of the Internet.197 Though some states do not
require either notice or withholding,198 those tests were developed before
the Internet became truly ingrained in the fabric of American free
speech.199 The Court’s notification requirement obligates the plaintiff to
post notice to the message board where the defamatory language was posted
before the court will enforce a subpoena to discover the identity of the
alleged defamer.200
Requiring the plaintiff to post notice in this manner has three potential
benefits. First, it detracts from the weight of defamatory statements.201 By
194. See infra Part IV.C.
195. Brodie, 966 A.2d at 457 (“[W]hen a trial court is confronted with a defamation action in
which anonymous speakers . . . are involved, it should, (1) require the plaintiff to undertake efforts
to notify the anonymous posters that they are the subject of a subpoena . . . , including posting a
message of notification of the identity discovery request on the message board.”).
196. Id. “[W]hen a trial court is confronted with a defamation action in which anonymous
speakers or pseudonyms are involved, it should . . . (2) withhold action to afford the anonymous
posters a reasonable opportunity to file and serve opposition to the application.”).
197. See supra Part III.B.1.
198. See, e.g., Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 578 (N.D. Cal. 1999)
(“Parties who have been injured by [Internet defamation] are likely to find themselves chasing the
tortfeasor from Internet Service Provider (ISP) to ISP, with little or no hope of actually
discovering the identity of the tortfeasor.”); see also In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to America
Online, Inc., 2000 WL 1210372, at *8 (2000) (making no mention of a requirement of notice in its
analysis).
199. Katy Noeth, The Never Ending Limits of §230: Extending ISP Immunity to the Sexual
Exploitation of Children, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 765, 776–77 (2009) (“Technological advances have
resulted in a drastically advanced cyber world from the one that existed . . . in 1996. The
landscape and modern realities of the Internet have changed significantly. Internet sites are
flourishing, and the Internet now serves almost 1.5 billion people. Internet usage increased
129.6% in North America alone from 2000 until 2008, and 305.5% throughout the rest of the
world.”). See also David Richards, Note, Posting Personal Information on the Internet: A Case
for Changing the Legal Regime Created by § 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 85 TEX. L.
REV. 1321, 1323 (describing the growing popularity of social networking sites like Facebook.com
and MySpace.com).
200. Brodie, 966 A.2d at 457.
201. See Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 464 (2005)
[A] person wronged by statements of an anonymous poster can respond instantly . . . to
the allegedly defamatory statements on the same site or blog, and thus, can, almost
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forcing a plaintiff to respond to the defamer directly, the Brodie court is
encouraging the type of anonymous debate that the Internet fosters.202
Although the Internet has emerged as the most popular forum for public
debate, it has a long way to go in reaching the level of credibility that other
forums have.203 Many Internet forums lack credibility because of the fact
that some of the same safeguards that exist in more conventional forms of
media do not exist with the Internet.204 Most Internet users are tuned in to
this truth and, therefore, read postings with a grain of salt.205 Thus, when a
plaintiff responds directly to an allegedly defamatory statement, readers of
the exchange may recognize the defamatory nature of the statement easier
and be more inclined to ignore it.206

contemporaneously, respond to the same audience that initially read the allegedly
defamatory statements. The plaintiff can thereby easily correct any misstatements or
falsehoods, respond to character attacks, and generally set the record straight.” Id.
202. See id. (finding that responding directly to attacks is an effective way of silencing critics);
See also Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997). “Through the use of chat rooms, any person
with a phone line can become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from
any soapbox.” Id.
203. See Krinsky v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231, 238 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
Users are able to engage freely in informal debate and criticism, leading many to
substitute gossip for accurate reporting and often to adopt a provocative, even
combative tone. . . . [O]nline discussions may look more like a vehicle for emotional
catharsis than a forum for rapid exchange of information and ideas. . . .”
Id. (citing Lidsky, supra note 74, at 863); see also Cahill, 884 A.2d at 465 (“Blogs and chat rooms
tend to be vehicles for the expression of opinions; by their very nature, they are not a source of
facts or data upon which a reasonable person would rely.”).
204. See Cahill, 884 A.2d at 466 (“[A] reasonable person reading a newspaper in print or
online . . . can assume that the statements are factually based and researched. This is not the case
when the statements are made on blogs or in chat rooms.”); see also Global Telemedia Int’l, Inc.
v. Doe, 132 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1264 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (“Unlike . . . traditional media, there are no
controls [for posting on the Internet].”). In order to have an editorial published in a newspaper the
author must submit his commentary to the editors of the newspaper and those editors must choose
to publish it. This safeguard often catches offensive material and material that is of little value,
and adds to the credibility of the statements that do make it through the screening process. Most
Internet forums favor direct user upload, and do not have the level of pre-approval before
comments are posted to the forums. See How to Submit an Article to the Op-Ed Page, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 11, 2010 (describing the process of getting an article published by the New York Times OpEd section), available at http://www nytimes.com/ref/membercenter/help/opedsubmit html.
205. See Global Telemedia, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 1268 (“The reasonable reader, looking at the
hundreds and thousands of postings [on an Internet forum] from a wide variety of posters, would
not expect that [anyone] was airing anything other than [their own] personal views . . . .”).
206. See Cahill, 884 A.2d at 464 (discussing how the Internet permits users to instantly
respond to criticisms and take the force out of defamatory statements by directly addressing those
comments).
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Second, the Brodie test’s requirements of notification and withholding
protect the alleged defamer from an ex parte207 action that would
permanently remove his anonymity.208 Once the identity of an anonymous
person is revealed, that person can never be anonymous again.209
Recognizing the irreversible nature of identification, the Brodie Court
included the withholding requirement to give a defamation defendant a
reasonable opportunity to defend against plaintiff’s allegations.210 The
withholding requirement is essential to protect the free flowing exchange of
ideas on the Internet, because it errs on the side of protecting anonymity.211
Third, the Brodie test’s requirements of notification and withholding
may prevent other people from posting defamatory statements on the
Internet.212 The Internet has become the principle place where people
obtain information, but it also has become a place where people come
together to vent.213 Often times the venting of one person causes a chain
reaction of posting that starts with legitimate concerns and devolves into
“cyber-smear.”214 Requiring a defamation plaintiff to post notice on the
same message board where the defamation occurred might sever the “chain
207. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 657 (9th ed. 2009) defines “ex parte” as “[o]n or from one
party only, usu. without notice to or argument from the adverse party.”
208. See Cahill, 884 A.2d at 461 (requiring the plaintiff to notify the defendant to avoid ex
parte proceedings); see also Doe v. 2THEMART.COM, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1093 (W.D.
Wash. 2001) (finding that the “potential chilling effect imposed by the unmasking of anonymous
speakers would diminish if litigants first were required to make a showing in court of their need
for the identifying information.”).
209. See 2THEMART.COM, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d at 1093 (finding that the First Amendment
right to anonymity includes in its scope, the right to remain anonymous after the speech is
concluded).
210. Independent Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 966 A.2d 432, 456 (Md. 2009).
211. 2THEMART.COM, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d at 1093 (“The free exchange of ideas on the
Internet is driven in large part by the ability of Internet users to communicate anonymously. If
Internet users could be stripped of . . . anonymity by a civil subpoena . . . this would have a
significant chilling effect in Internet communications and thus on basic First Amendment
rights.”); see Ken Kumayama, Note, A Right to Pseudonymity, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 427, 439 (arguing
that if anonymity is removed from the Internet, people will resort to self-censorship and the free
flowing exchange of ideas will stop).
212. See Cahill, 884 A.2d at 464 (noting that by posting notification directly to the same
Internet forum where the allegedly defamatory statement was posted, a plaintiff can “set the
record straight”).
213. See Krinsky v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231, 238 (Cal. App. 2008).
Users are able to engage freely in informal debate and criticism, leading many to
substitute gossip for accurate reporting and often to adopt a provocative, even
combative tone. . . . [O]nline discussions may look more like a vehicle for emotional
catharsis than a forum for rapid exchange of information and ideas. . . .”
Id. (citing Lidsky, supra note 74, at 863.).
214. Id.
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of venting” and discourage subsequent posters from posting borderline
defamatory statements.215
B. The Prima Facie Showing Standard in the Brodie Test Properly Sets a
High Enough Yet Attainable Burden for Plaintiffs in Defamation Actions
In developing its own test, the Brodie court analyzed the tests applied by
other state courts in similar situations.216 The court followed a majority of
its sister states in requiring a plaintiff to make a prima facie showing of a
claim of defamation before the court will enforce a subpoena ordering the
discovery of the identity of the defamatory defendant.217 To establish a
prima facie claim of defamation the plaintiff must show: “(1) that the
defendant made a defamatory statement to a third person, (2) that the
statement was false, (3) that the defendant was legally at fault in making the
statement, and (4) that the plaintiff thereby suffered harm.”218 Courts that
reject this standard as too burdensome argue that the standard requires a
plaintiff to invest too much time into his case without any assurance that he
will be able to recover from the defendant.219 This argument is misplaced.
In a defamatory action, the identity of the defendant has little to no bearing
on a plaintiff’s ability to prove a prima facie case.220
A lower burden of proof, like the good faith basis test applied by the
AOL Court,221 would benefit frivolous plaintiffs by giving them easy access
to types of extra-judicial relief.222 If able to reveal the identity of their
alleged defamer without showing more than “good faith,” plaintiffs would
be able to expose possibly innocent people to public criticism, ostracism,
and other things that the right to anonymity is designed to protect

215. See Cahill, 884 A.2d at 464 (by posting a direct response to the allegedly defamatory
statement, a plaintiff may be able to limit the damage of the defamatory statement).
216. Independent Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 966 A.2d 432, 447–57 (Md. 2009).
217. Id. at 456.
218. Offen v. Brenner, 935 A.2d 719, 723–24 (Md. 2007).
219. See Krinsky v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231, 242–43 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (discussing that
Dendrite’s burden was too high so Cahill adopted a lower “motion for summary judgment”
standard).
220. See Offen, 935 A.2d at 723–24. The identity of the defendant is not an element of the
cause of action of defamation. See id. Logically, the identity of the defendant does not impact the
plaintiff’s ability to recover. If he has a valid cause of action, he will be able to recover. If he does
not have a valid cause of action, then he will not be able to recover no matter who the defendant
is. See id.
221. In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc., 2000 WL 1210372, at *8 (2000).
222. See Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 458 (Del. 2005) (“In our view, this ‘good faith’ standard is too
easily satisfied to protect sufficiently a defendant’s right to speak anonymously.”).
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against.223 Even the burden that requires a showing sufficient to survive a
motion to dismiss is too low, because Maryland is a notice pleading
state.224 In a notice pleading state, any allegation that puts the opposing
party on notice of the claim is sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss,
even if the allegation is “vague or lacking in detail.”225 This means that a
plaintiff doesn’t have to prove anything before exposing the defendant’s
identity.226 Rather, he would have the ability to expose the identity of an
alleged defamer as long as the plaintiff simply puts the defendant on notice
that he is being sued.227 In this scenario, a plaintiff could file suit against an
anonymous defendant, expose the defendant’s identity, and abuse the
lenient standard.228 Having a burden lower than prima facie proof of
plaintiff’s case would result in a level of extra-judicial relief incompatible
with the First Amendment right to anonymity.229
C. The Fifth Element of the Brodie Test Erases the Stability of the Test and
Provides Maryland with the Least Clear Standard of Any State by
Ultimately Deferring to the Discretion of the Trial Judge
The clarity provided by the Brodie Court’s first four elements of its test is
completely destroyed by its fifth element.230 By adding a balancing element
to the tail end of the test, the Brodie decision has the potential to cause
more problems than it solves.231 First, the balancing test allows a judge to
override the written law because it grants the trial court discretion to refuse
to order the disclosure of the identity of the defendant only after the
plaintiff has proven his prima facie cause of action.232 If the plaintiff fails
223. See supra, note 125 and accompanying text.
224. See Cahill, 884 A.2d at 458 (“[E]ven the more stringent motion to dismiss standard, the
middle option in the spectrum of standards from which we may choose, falls short of providing
sufficient protection to a defendant’s First Amendment right to speak anonymously.”); MD. CODE
ANN., RULES §2-303(b) (West 2009) (“Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and
direct. No technical forms of pleadings are required.”).
225. Krinsky v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231, 243 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 242–43.
229. See Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756, 770 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001)
(finding that a motion to dismiss standard fails to provide a basis for an analysis and balancing of
plaintiff’s request for disclosure in light of defendant’s competing right of anonymity and free
speech).
230. Independent Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 966 A.2d 432, 459 (Md. 2009) (Adkins, J.,
concurring).
231. Id.
232. See id. at 456 (majority opinion) (“if all else is satisfied, balance . . .”) (emphasis added);
see also Mobilisa, Inc. v. Doe, 170 P.3d 712, 725 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (Barker, J., dissenting) (“I
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to prove a prima facie cause of action, then there is no need for the court to
apply the balancing test.233 Essentially, the balancing test gives the court
the power to refuse to grant plaintiff a remedy even where plaintiff has
already proven his valid cause of action.234 This balancing test is contrary
to the established law and invites the trial courts to impose what one judge
referred to as a “superlaw” that trumps the well established defamation
law.235
At its worst, the balancing test gives too much discretion to trial judges
and allows them to rule on a case without explaining why they reached their
decisions.236 The balancing test creates the potential for judges to abuse
their discretion and create inconsistent law that strays greatly from the
intended outcome of the Brodie decision of providing “guidance to the trial
courts.”237 The balancing test affords the Maryland circuit courts a level of
discretion238 that spawns unpredictability. This discretion allows the trial
courts to disregard the established law and essentially determine the
outcome of cases by ignoring the first four elements of the Brodie test and
using its sole discretion.239 The Brodie Court should have established a
bright-line rule because a bright-line rule would more fully comport with
the Brodie decision’s stated goal of “guidance to the trial courts.”240
A recent unpublished decision by the Superior Court of New Jersey
illustrates how having a balancing test in this area of law may lead to
judicial confusion and inconsistent results.241 In Zubowski v. Doe,242 the
New Jersey trial court applied the Dendrite test to determine whether or not
to quash various subpoenas seeking to discover the identity of an
anonymous individual accused of defaming the plaintiff Alexandra

do not believe the Constitution permits taking away the party-plaintiff’s right to seek redress. The
elimination of such a claim is the only purpose that a balancing test serves . . .”).
233. Brodie, 966 A.2d at 457.
234. Id. at 459 (Adkins, J., concurring) (stating that the majority’s balancing test gives the trial
court the authority to decide that a plaintiff’s cause of action fails even though it meets, on a prima
facie basis, all of the common law requirements).
235. Id. (“[T]he majority decision invites the lower courts to apply, on an ad hoc basis, a
‘superlaw’ of Internet defamation that can trump the well-established defamation law.”).
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 435 (majority opinion)
239. Id. at 459 (Adkins, J., concurring).
240. See generally Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
1175 (1989) (arguing that courts should apply bright-line rules rather than discretionary tests).
241. See, Zubowski v. Doe, No. BER-L-6469-08 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Feb. 24, 2009)
(applying the Dendrite test to a defamation case).
242. Id.
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Zubowski.243 The trial court judge found that the first three elements of the
Dendrite test were met, and most importantly, found that the plaintiff had
proven her case on a prima facie basis.244 Even though the court found that
the plaintiff had proven a prima facie case of defamation, the court granted
the defendant’s motion and quashed the subpoena.245 This result was made
possible by the use of a balancing test.246 The court balanced the strengths
of plaintiff’s claim of defamation against the defendant’s First Amendment
rights and found that the First Amendment rights outweighed the plaintiff’s
claim for defamation.247 In Zubowski, the court granted the motion to quash
even though the plaintiff had satisfied the most rigorous standard that courts
employ in these types of cases.248 The court’s opinion demonstrates that
when even when a plaintiff has proven a prima facie case of defamation he
may not be granted the chance to proceed to a case on the merits because of
this balancing test.249
A second problem with the balancing element of the Brodie test is that
the balancing portion of the test is essentially immune from appeal.250 In
other instances where the Maryland Court of Appeals has laid down
elements and told the trial court to apply a balancing test, the Court will not
reverse the discretion of a trial court judge as long as he has followed the
non-balancing elements of the test.251 With much more difficult appeals, a
class of plaintiffs with valid claims may be barred from recovering damages
caused by defamatory statements. If there was no balancing element, the

243. Id. The defamatory statements in question were a letter and several pictures that accused
the plaintiff of breaking several laws. Id. at 2.
244. Id. at 2–8.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 11.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. See id.
250. See Cooley v. State, 867 A.2d 1065, 1071 (Md. 2005) (“Ordinarily, a trial court’s order
denying a motion . . . will be reviewed on appeal if it is claimed that the trial court abused its
discretion.”); see also Arrington v. State, 983 A.2d 1071, 1087 (Md. 2009) (finding that a ruling
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard will not be reversed simply because the appellate
court would have not made the same ruling, rather the lower court’s decision must have been
based on “untenable grounds,” “violative of fact and logic,” and “against the logic and effect of
facts and inferences before the court”) (citing Gray v. State, 879 A.2d 1064, 1073–74 (Md. 2005)).
251. See, e.g., Flanagan v. Flanagan, 956 A.2d 829, 846 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008) (finding
that in family law cases, whether a trial court followed the non-balancing questions of fact will be
reviewed de novo, but the decision to award a monetary award––which requires a balancing of
elements––will be reviewed on an abuse of discretion standard).
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standard of review for an order enforcing a subpoena to discover the
identity of an anonymous Internet forum participant would be de novo.252
A third problem with the balancing element is that it may encourage
defamation on the Internet. The balancing element of the Brodie test only
comes into play when a plaintiff has already proven a prima facie case of
defamation.253 This allows circuit court judges the discretion to dismiss a
case where the plaintiff has prima facie proven defamation, but the
balancing element of the Brodie test does not matter if the plaintiff falls
short of proving a prima facie case.254 Furthermore, the balancing test
attempts to balance two lopsided interests.255 The balancing test pits a
Constitutional right against a statutory right and necessarily leans towards
the interest in protecting a defendant’s right to anonymity even where the
plaintiff has proven their right to recovery.256 Therefore, if Maryland keeps
this balancing element, the Court will necessarily lean to the side of
protecting anonymity.257 If the Court continues to lean to the side of
protecting anonymity, then people may become more cavalier in what they
decide to post on the Internet and the Internet may devolve into a haven for
defamation.
Maryland should eliminate the balancing element from the Brodie test
because it is counterproductive to the clarity of the first four elements of its
test. The Internet is beginning to replace many other forms of
communication, and if it isn’t already, it is poised for total immersion into
every facet of American life.258 The Internet has the potential to be the most
efficient, credible, and widespread medium for the exercise of free speech
in the world because of what it offers in terms of anonymity, accessibility
and speed.259 For the Internet to ever realize that potential, however, the
252. See id. A de novo standard of review is preferred to an abuse of discretion standard,
because de novo review gives the appellate court the opportunity to reexamine the facts of the
case, and make a ruling independent of the trial court’s finding of facts. See Gray v. State, 879
A.2d 1064, 1068 (Md. 2005) (“When the trial court’s order involves an interpretation and
application of Maryland statutory and case law, our Court must determine whether the lower
court’s conclusions are legally correct under a de novo standard of review.”) (internal citations
omitted).
253. See Independent Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 966 A.2d 432, 457 (Md. 2008) (majority
opinion).
254. Id.
255. See, Maxon v. Ottawa Pub. Co., 929 N.E.2d 666, 676 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (noting that the
balancing test attempts to balance a Constitutional right with a statutory right).
256. Id.
257. See Brodie, 966 A.2d at 459 (Md. 2009) (Adkins, J., concurring).
258. See supra Part III.B.1.
259. See Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 456 (Del. 2005) (discussing the reach of the Internet: “A
person in Alaska can have a conversation with a person in Japan about beekeeping in Bangladesh,
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abuse of anonymity needs to be curtailed.260 In order to curtail the abuse of
anonymity on the Internet, Maryland needs to apply a bright line rule that
does not leave any room for judicial discretion.261 If Maryland applies a
bright line rule (like the one found in the first four elements of the Brodie
test), then individuals will know when they have crossed that line, and those
that cross the line will be punished.262 The balancing element of the Brodie
test blurs the line between defamation and non-defamation and creates an
inefficient and unworkable standard, which will only lead to confusion.263
VI. Conclusion

In Independent Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 264 the Court of Appeals of
Maryland established the standard for Maryland Courts to follow to balance
an individual’s First Amendment right to speak anonymously on the
Internet against a plaintiff’s right to seek judicial redress for defamation. In
this case of first impression, the Court developed a five-part test consisting
of: (1) notice; (2) opportunity to respond; (3) identifying the exact
statements alleged to be defamatory; (4) prima facie proof of the
allegations; and (5) a balancing test.265 While the first four elements of the
Brodie court’s test provide much direction,266 the inclusion of a balancing
component, causes the Brodie test to fall short of its goal of establishing a
clear standard for Maryland’s trial courts to apply.267 The Brodie test’s
balancing element creates a danger unique to Internet defamation that gives
just as easily as several Smyrna residents can have a conversation about Smyrna politics.”); see In
re Does 1-10, 242 S.W.3d 805, 820 (Tex. App. 2007) (“Internet anonymity serves a particularly
vital role in the exchange of ideas and robust debate on matters of public concern.”). See also, Doe
v. 2THEMART.COM, 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1092 (W.D. Wash. 2001). “The ‘ability to speak
one’s mind’ on the Internet ‘without the burden of the other party knowing all the facts about
one’s identity can foster open communication and robust debate.’” Id. (quoting Columbia Ins. Co.
v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 578 (N.D.Cal. 1999)).
260. See Krinsky v. Doe 6, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 231, 238 (Cal. App. 2008).
Users are able to engage freely in informal debate and criticism, leading many to
substitute gossip for accurate reporting and often to adopt a provocative, even
combative tone. . . . [O]nline discussions may look more like a vehicle for emotional
catharsis than a forum for rapid exchange of information and ideas. . . .
Id. (citing Lidsky, supra note 74, at 863).
261. See Cahill, 884 A.2d at 461 (finding that the balancing test at the end of the Dendrite test
needlessly complicated the analysis.
262. Brodie, 966 A.2d at 457–59 (Adkins, J., concurring).
263. Id.
264. 966 A.2d 432 (Md. 2009).
265. Id. at 457.
266. See supra Parts IV.A.,B.
267. See supra Part IV.C.
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too much discretion to trial judges and if upheld and applied by other states,
the Brodie test will hinder the development of the Internet and keep it from
reaching its potential as a truly credible public forum.268

268. See supra Part IV.C.
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